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Abstract
This paper estimates a Bayesian VAR for the US economy which includes a housing 
sector and addresses the following questions. Can developments in the housing sector 
be explained on the basis of developments in real and nominal GDP and interest rates? 
What are the effects of housing demand shocks on the economy? How does monetary 
policy affect the housing market? What are the implications of house price develop-
ments for the stance of monetary policy? Regarding the latter question, we implement a 
version of a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) due to Céspedes et al. (2006).
Keywords: House prices, monetary conditions index, Bayesian VAR, monetary policy 
shock, conditional forecast. 
JEL Classification: E3-E4 
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Non-technical summary 
The current financial turmoil, triggered by increasing defaults in the sub-prime 
mortgage market in the United States, has re-ignited the debate about the impact of 
the housing market on the economy at large and about how monetary policy should 
respond to booming house prices. Reviewing the role of housing investment in post-
WWII business cycles in the United States, Leamer (2007) concludes that “problems 
in residential investment have contributed 26% of the weakness in the economy in the 
year before the eight recessions” and suggests that in the most recent boom and bust 
period highly stimulative monetary policy by the Fed first contributed to a booming 
housing market and subsequently led to an abrupt contraction as the yield curve 
inverted. Similarly, using counterfactual simulations Taylor (2007) shows that the 
period of exceptionally low short-term interest rates in 2003 and 2004 (compared to a 
Taylor rule) may have substantially contributed to the boom in housing starts and may 
have led to an upward spiral of higher house prices, falling delinquency and 
foreclosure rates, more favourable credit ratings and financing conditions and higher 
demand for housing. As the short-term interest rates returned to normal levels, 
housing demand rapidly fell bringing down both construction and house price 
inflation. In contrast, Mishkin (2007) illustrates the limited ability of standard models 
to explain the most recent housing developments and emphasises the uncertainty 
associated with housing-related monetary transmission channels. He also warns 
against leaning against rapidly increasing house prices over and above their effects on 
the outlook for economic activity and inflation and suggests instead a pre-emptive 
easing of policy when a house price bubble bursts to avoid a large loss in economic 
activity. Even more recently, Kohn (2007) says “I suspect that, when studies are done 
with cooler reflection, the causes of the swing in house prices will be seen as less a 
consequence of monetary policy and more a result of the emotions of excessive 
optimism followed by fear experienced every so often in the marketplace through the 
ages. Low policy interest rates early in this decade helped feed the initial rise in house 
prices. However, the worst excesses in the market probably occurred when short-term 
interest rates were already well on their way to more normal levels, but longer-term 
rates were held down by a variety of forces.”
In this paper we review the role of the housing market and monetary policy in US 
business cycles over the period 1987:1 to 2007:2 using an identified Bayesian Vector 
Autoregressive (BVAR) model. We use the BVAR to perform three exercises. First, 
we analyse the housing boom and bust in the new millennium using conditional 
forecasts by asking the question: Conditional on the estimated model, can we forecast 
the housing boom and bust based on observed real GDP, prices and short and long-
term interest rate developments. This is a first attempt at understanding the sources of 
the swing in residential construction and house prices in the new millennium. In the 
benchmark VAR, our finding is that housing market developments can only partially 
be explained by nominal and real GDP developments. In particular, the strong rise in 
house prices in 2000 and the peak of house price increases in 2006 cannot be 
explained. Adding developments in the federal funds rate and the long-term interest 
rate to the information set helps forecasting the housing boom somewhat better.  
Second, we identify the effects of housing demand, monetary policy and term spread 
shocks on the economy. We find that the effects of housing demand and monetary 
policy shocks are broadly in line with the existing empirical literature. Housing 
demand shocks have significant effects on residential investment and house prices, 
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but overall these shocks appear to have had only a limited impact on the performance 
of the US economy in terms of aggregate growth and inflation. There is also evidence
that monetary policy has significant effects on residential investment and house prices 
and that easy monetary policy designed to stave off perceived risks of deflation in 
2002 to 2004 has contributed to the boom in the housing market in 2004 and 2005. 
However, again the impact on the overall economy was limited. A counterfactual 
simulation suggests that without those policy shocks inflation would have been about 
25 basis points lower at the end of 2006.
Finally, in the light of the above findings and following a methodology proposed by 
Céspedes et al. (2006), we explore the use of a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), 
which includes the federal funds rate, the long-term interest rate spread and real house 
prices, to measure the stance of monetary policy. The idea of measuring monetary 
conditions by taking an appropriate weight of financial asset prices was pioneered by 
the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in the 1990s. As both 
countries are small open economies, these central banks worried about how changes 
in the value of the exchange rate may affect the monetary policy stance. The idea was 
to construct a weighted index of the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate, 
where the weights reflected the relative impact of those monetary conditions on an 
intermediate or final target variable, such as the output gap, output growth or 
inflation. A number of authors have extended the idea of the MCI to other asset prices 
arguing that those asset prices may be equally or more important than the exchange 
rate. A prominent example is Goodhart and Hofmann (2007), who argue that real 
house prices should receive a significant weight because of its large impact on the 
economy and inflation in particular. In contrast to this literature, the crucial feature of 
the MCI methodology proposed by Céspedes et al. (2006) is that it takes into account 
that interest rates and house prices are endogenous variables that systematically 
respond to the state of the economy. As a result, their MCI can more naturally be 
interpreted as a measure of the monetary policy stance. Using the identified Bayesian 
VAR, we apply the methodology to the question whether the rise in house prices and 
the fall in long-term interest rates led to an implicit easing of monetary policy in the 
United States. We show that, in spite of the endogeneity of house prices to both the 
state of the economy and the level of interest rates, taking house prices into account 
may sharpen the inference on whether the stance of monetary policy has changed over 
time. Given the uncertainty about the sources of business cycle fluctuations and the 
impact of the various shocks (including housing demand shocks) on the economy, 
uncertainty regarding the stance of monetary policy remains high. Nevertheless, 
taking the development of house prices into account, there is some indication that 
monetary conditions may have been too loose in 2004 and were relatively tight in the 
summer of 2007. 
Various caveats of the methodology we use in this paper are worth mentioning. First, 
all the analysis presented in this paper is in-sample and ex-post. While this is helpful 
in trying to understand past developments, it clearly is not sufficient to prove its real-
time usefulness. For that, we need to extend the analysis to a real-time context. 
Second, the statistical model we use to interpret the US housing market and business 
cycle is basically a linear one. It has been argued that costly asset price booms and 
busts are fundamentally of an asymmetric nature. Our linear methodology is not able 
to handle such non-linearities. Third, the robustness of the analysis to different 
identification schemes for the structural shocks needs to be further examined. We 
hope to shed some light on some of these issues in further analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The current financial turmoil, triggered by increasing defaults in the sub-prime mortgage 
market in the United States, has re-ignited the debate about the impact of the housing market 
on the economy at large and about how monetary policy should respond to booming house 
prices.1 Reviewing the role of housing investment in post-WWII business cycles in the United 
States, Leamer (2007) concludes that “problems in residential investment have contributed 
26% of the weakness in the economy in the year before the eight recessions” and suggests that 
in the most recent boom and bust period highly stimulative monetary policy by the Fed first 
contributed to a booming housing market and subsequently led to an abrupt contraction as the 
yield curve inverted. Similarly, using counterfactual simulations Taylor (2007) shows that the 
period of exceptionally low short-term interest rates in 2003 and 2004 (compared to a Taylor 
rule) may have substantially contributed to the boom in housing starts and may have led to an 
upward spiral of higher house prices, falling delinquency and foreclosure rates, more 
favourable credit ratings and financing conditions and higher demand for housing. As the 
short-term interest rates returned to normal levels, housing demand rapidly fell bringing down 
both construction and house price inflation. In contrast, Mishkin (2007) illustrates the limited 
ability of standard models to explain the most recent housing developments and emphasises 
the uncertainty associated with housing-related monetary transmission channels. He also 
warns against leaning against rapidly increasing house prices over and above their effects on 
the outlook for economic activity and inflation and suggests instead a pre-emptive easing of 
policy when a house price bubble bursts to avoid a large loss in economic activity. Even more 
recently, Kohn (2007) says “I suspect that, when studies are done with cooler reflection, the 
causes of the swing in house prices will be seen as less a consequence of monetary policy and 
more a result of the emotions of excessive optimism followed by fear experienced every so 
often in the marketplace through the ages. Low policy interest rates early in this decade 
helped feed the initial rise in house prices. However, the worst excesses in the market 
probably occurred when short-term interest rates were already well on their way to more 
normal levels, but longer-term rates were held down by a variety of forces.”   
In this paper we review the role of the housing market and monetary policy in US business 
cycles since the second half of the 1980s using an identified Bayesian Vector Autoregressive 
(BVAR) model. We focus on the last two decades for a number of reasons. First, following 
the “Great Inflation” of the 1970s, inflation measured by the GDP deflator has been relatively 
stable between 0 and 4% since the mid-1980s. As discussed by Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
(1999) and many others, this is likely to be partly due to a more systematic monetary policy 
                                                     
1  See the annual economic symposium organised by the Kansas City Fed in Jackson Hole on 30 
August 2007 on “Housing, housing finance and monetary policy”. A literature survey is presented 
in Mishkin (2007).  
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approach geared at maintaining price stability. Second, there is significant evidence that the 
volatility of real GDP growth has fallen since 1984 (e.g. Pérez-Quirós and McConnell, 2000). 
An important component of this fall in volatility has been a fall in the volatility of residential 
investment. Moreover, Mojon (2007) has shown that a major contribution to the “Great 
Moderation” has been a fall in the correlation between interest-rate sensitive consumer 
investment such as housing investment and the other components of GDP. This suggests that 
the role of housing investment in the business cycle may have changed since the deregulation 
of the mortgage market in the early 1980s. Indeed, Dynan et al. (2005) find that the interest 
rate sensitivity of residential investment has fallen over this period.  
We use the BVAR to perform three exercises. First, we analyse the housing boom and bust in 
the new millennium using conditional forecasts by asking the question: Conditional on the 
estimated model, can we forecast the housing boom and bust based on observed real GDP, 
prices and short and long-term interest rate developments. This is a first attempt at 
understanding the sources of the swing in residential construction and house prices in the new 
millennium. In the benchmark VAR, our finding is that housing market developments can 
only partially be explained by nominal and real GDP developments. In particular, the strong 
rise in house prices in 2000 and the peak of house price increases in 2006 cannot be 
explained. Adding the federal funds rate to the information set helps forecasting the housing 
boom. Interestingly, most of the variations in the term spread can also be explained on the 
basis of the short-term interest rate, but there is some evidence of a long-term interest rate 
conundrum in 2005 and 2006. As a result, observing the long-term interest rate also provides 
some additional information to explain the boom in house prices.  
Second, using a mixture of zero and sign restrictions, we identify the effects of a housing 
demand, monetary policy and term spread shock on the economy. We find that the effects of 
housing demand and monetary policy shocks are broadly in line with the existing empirical 
literature. We also analyse the role of those shocks in explaining the housing boom and its 
impact on the wider economy. We find that both housing market and monetary policy shocks 
explain a significant fraction of the construction and house price boom, but their effects on 
overall GDP growth and inflation are relatively contained.  
Finally, in the light of the above findings and following a methodology proposed by Céspedes 
et al. (2006), we explore the use of a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which includes the 
federal funds rate, the long-term interest rate spread and real house prices, to measure the 
stance of monetary policy. The idea of measuring monetary conditions by taking an 
appropriate weight of financial asset prices was pioneered by the Bank of Canada and the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand in the 1990s. As both countries are small open economies, 
these central banks worried about how changes in the value of the exchange rate may affect 
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the monetary policy stance.2 The idea was to construct a weighted index of the short-term 
interest rate and the exchange rate, where the weights reflected the relative impact of those 
monetary conditions on an intermediate or final target variable, such as the output gap, output 
growth or inflation. A number of authors have extended the idea of the MCI to other asset 
prices arguing that those asset prices may be equally or more important than the exchange 
rate. A prominent example is Goodhart and Hofmann (2007), who argue that real house prices 
should receive a significant weight because of its large impact on the economy and inflation in 
particular. In contrast to this literature, the crucial feature of the MCI methodology proposed 
by Céspedes et al. (2006) is that it takes into account that interest rates and house prices are 
endogenous variables that systematically respond to the state of the economy. As a result, 
their MCI can more naturally be interpreted as a measure of the monetary policy stance. Using 
the identified Bayesian VAR, we apply the methodology to the question whether the rise in 
house prices and the fall in long-term interest rates led to an implicit easing of monetary 
policy in the United States.  
In the rest of this paper, we first present two specifications of the estimated BVAR. We then 
use both BVARs to calculate conditional forecasts of the housing market boom and bust in the 
new millennium. In Section 3, we identify housing demand, monetary policy and term spread 
shocks, and investigate their effect on the US economy. Finally, in Section 4 we develop the 
MCI and show using a simple analytical example how the methodology works and why it is 
important to take into account the endogeneity of short and long-term interest rates and house 
prices with respect to the state of the economy. We then use the estimated BVARs to address 
the question whether long-term interest rates and house prices play a significant role in 
measuring the stance of monetary policy. Finally, Section 5 contains some conclusions and 
discusses some of the shortcomings and areas for future research.
2. A Bayesian VAR with housing for the US economy 
In this section, we present the results from estimating a 9-variable BVAR of order five for the 
US economy. In addition to standard variables such as real GDP, the GDP deflator, 
commodity prices, the federal funds rate and M2, we include real consumption, real 
residential investment, real house prices and the long-term interest rate spread. To measure 
house price inflation, we use the nation-wide Case-Shiller house price index, which limits our 
sample to start from 1987Q1 and it ends in 2007Q2. We estimate two specifications of the 
VAR. One is a traditional VAR in levels and uses a standard Minnesota prior. The other VAR 
is specified in growth rates and uses priors about the steady state (see Villani, 2008).  
                                                     
2  See, for example, Freedman (1994, 1995ab) and Duguay (1994). 
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More specifically, in the level-VAR (L-VAR) the vector of endogenous variables is given by: 
(1) > @ttttttttttt msicpphpYHIpcy /
where all variables are in logs, with the exception of the federal funds rate ( ti ), the long-term 
interest rate spread ( ts ), and the residential investment share of GDP (HIt/Yt). ty  is real 
GDP, ct is real consumption, tp  is the GDP deflator, thp  is real house prices, tcp  is 
commodity prices and tm  is the money stock.3
In the differences-VAR (D-VAR) the vector of endogenous variables is instead given by: 
(2) > @/t t t t t t t t t t ty c p HI Y hp p cp i s m' ' ' ' ' ' '
where '  is the difference operator and the BVAR is parameterized in terms of deviations 
from steady state. 
The main difference between the two specifications is related to the assumptions one makes 
about the steady state of the endogenous variables. The advantage of the D-VAR with a prior 
on the joint steady state, is that it guarantees that the growth rates are reasonable and mutually 
consistent in the long run, in spite of the short sample used in the estimation. The cost is that it 
discards important sample information contained in the level variables. As we discuss below, 
this may be the main reason behind the larger error bands around its impulse responses and 
conditional projections. Although the forecasts of the L-VAR match the data better at shorter 
horizons, the longer-run unconditional forecasts it produces make less sense from an 
economic point of view. As these considerations may matter for assessing the monetary policy 
stance, we report the findings using both specifications. 
In both cases the estimation is Bayesian. In the case of the D-VAR, it involves specifying a 
prior on the steady state of the VAR and a Minnesota prior on dynamic coefficients, as has 
been introduced in Villani (2008). The Minnesota prior uses standard settings and is the same 
as the one for the levels specification. The informative prior on the steady state of the VAR 
serves two roles: first, it regularizes inference on the steady states of variables. Without it, the 
posterior distribution of the steady states is ill specified, because of the singularity at the unit 
root. Second, and this is our innovation with respect to the approach of Villani (2008), we use 
economic theory to specify prior correlations between steady states. The steady state nominal 
interest rate is, by the Fisher equation, required to be the sum of the steady state inflation rate 
and the equilibrium real interest rate. The steady state real interest rate is, in turn, required to 
                                                     
3  See the data appendix for the sources of the time series. 
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be equal to the steady state output growth rate, plus a small error reflecting time preference 
and a risk premium. The steady state output and consumption growth rates are also correlated 
a priori, as we think of them as having a common steady state. 
The prior and posterior means and standard deviations of the steady states in the D-VAR are 
given in Table 1.  
{Insert Table 1} 
Figure 1 plots the data we use, as well as the estimated steady state values from the D-VAR. 
The steady state growth rate of real GDP is estimated to be close to 3 percent over the 
estimation period. Average GDP deflator inflation is somewhat above 2%. The steady state 
residential investment to GDP ratio is about 4.5%. During the new millennium construction 
boom the ratio rose by 1 percentage point peaking at 5.5% in 2005 before dropping below its 
long-term average in the 2nd quarter of 2007. Real house price developments mirror the 
developments in the construction sector. The estimated steady state real growth rate of house 
prices is 1.5 percent over the sample period. However, real house price changes were negative 
during the early 1990s recession. House price growth rates rose above average in the late 
1990s and accelerated significantly above its estimated steady state reaching a maximum 
annual growth rate of more than 10 percent in 2005, before falling abruptly to negative growth 
rates in 2006 and 2007. Turning to interest rate developments, the estimated steady state 
nominal interest rate is around 5 percent. The estimated steady state term spread, i.e. the 
difference between the 10-year bond yield rate and the federal funds rate, is 1.4 percent. In the 
analysis below, we will mostly focus on the boom and bust period in the housing market 
starting in 2000. 
{Insert Figure 1} 
Using both BVAR specifications we then ask the following question: Can we explain 
developments in the housing market based on observed developments in real and nominal 
GDP and the short and long-term interest rates? To answer this question we make use of the 
conditional forecasting methodology developed by Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) and 
Waggoner and Zha (1999).  
Figures 2a and 2b report the results for the D-VAR and the L-VAR respectively, focusing on 
the post-2000 period. Each figure shows the actual developments of the housing 
investment/GDP ratio (first column) and the annual real growth rate of house prices (second 
column), as well as the unconditional forecast and a forecast conditional on observed real and 
nominal GDP (first row), observed real and nominal GDP and the federal funds rate (second 
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row) and observed real and nominal GDP, the federal funds rate and the term spread (third 
row). Note that this is an in-sample analysis in the sense that the respective VARs are 
estimated over the full sample period. The idea behind increasing the information set is to see 
to what extent short and long-term interest rates provide information about developments in 
the housing market, in addition to the information already contained in real and nominal GDP.   
{Insert Figure 2a} 
A number of interesting observations can be made. First, as discussed above, the 
unconditional forecasts of residential investment and real house price growth are quite 
different in both VARs. The D-VAR projects the housing investment-GDP ratio to fluctuate 
mildly around its steady state, while the growth rate of house prices is projected to return quite 
quickly to its steady state of 1.5 percent from the relatively high level of growth of more than 
5 percent at the end of 1999. The L-VAR instead captures some of the persistent in-sample 
fluctuations and projects a further rise in housing investment and house price growth before it 
returns to close to the sample mean in 2007.  
Second, based on the D-VAR in Figure 2a, neither GDP developments nor short or long-term 
interest rates can explain why real house prices continued to grow at rates above 5 percent 
following the slowdown of the economy in 2000 and 2001. Real and nominal GDP 
developments can explain an important fraction of the housing boom in 2002 and 2003, but 
they cannot account for the acceleration of house price growth to 10 percent in 2004 and 
2005. The low level of short and long-term interest rates helps explaining the 2004 and 2005 
boom. In particular towards the end of 2004 and in 2005, the unusually low level of long-term 
interest rates helps accounting for the acceleration in house prices. According to this model, 
there is some evidence of a “conundrum” in the sense that in this period long-term interest 
rates are lower than would be expected on the basis of observed short-term interest rates. The 
ability to better forecast the boom period comes, however, at the expense of larger 
unexplained undershooting of house prices and housing investment towards the end of the 
sample. Overall, these results suggest that the unusually low level of short and long-term 
interest rates may have contributed to the boom in US housing markets in the new 
millennium. 
{Insert Figure 2b} 
Third, the results based on the L-VAR in Figure 2b are, however, less clear. The part of the 
housing boom that cannot be explained by developments in real and nominal GDP is smaller. 
Moreover, adding short and long-term interest rates to the data set does not change the picture 
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very significantly. These findings suggest that the results of the analysis partly depend on the 
assumed steady state behaviour of the housing market and interest rates.     
3. Identifying housing demand, monetary policy and term spread shocks 
In order to put a bit more structure on the analysis, in this section we identify housing 
demand, monetary policy and term spread shocks in order to analyse their effect on the 
economy. We use a mixture of a recursive identification scheme and sign restrictions. As 
usual, monetary policy shocks are identified by zero restrictions. They are assumed to affect 
economic activity and prices with a one quarter lag, but they may have an immediate impact 
on the term spread and the money stock. The housing demand shock is a shock that affects 
residential investment and house prices contemporaneously and in the same direction. 
Moreover, its immediate impact on output is roughly equal to the increase in residential 
investment (i.e. this shock has no contemporaneous effect on the other components of output 
taken together). We use sign restrictions to impose this identification scheme4. For simplicity 
we also assume that this shock only affects the GDP deflator with a lag. The shock that affects 
residential investment and house prices in opposite directions can be interpreted as a housing 
supply shock. However, it turns out that this shock explains only a small fraction of 
developments in the housing market, so that we will not explicitly discuss this shock. Figure 3 
shows the estimated impulse responses together with a 68% posterior probability region for 
both VAR specifications.  
{Insert Figure 3} 
A number of observations are worth making. Overall, both VAR specifications give similar 
estimated impulse response functions. One difference worth noting is that relative to the L-
VAR specification, the D-VAR (shaded impulse response functions) incorporates larger and 
more persistent effects on house prices and the GDP deflator. In what follows, we focus on 
the more precisely estimated L-VAR specification. According to Figure 3, a one standard 
deviation housing demand shock leads to a persistent rise in real house prices of about 0.75 
percent and an increase in the residential investment share of about 0.05 percentage points. 
The impact on the overall economy is for real GDP to rise by about 0.10 percent after 4 
quarters, while the effect on the GDP deflator takes longer (about 3 years) to peak at 0.08 
percent above baseline. Note that the peak impact on prices in the D-VAR specification is 
quite a bit larger. The monetary policy response as captured by the federal funds rate is 
initially limited, but eventually the federal funds rate increases by about 20 basis points after 
                                                     
4 For a discussion of VAR identification with sign restrictions see e.g. Uhlig (2005). 
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two years. The initial effect on the term spread is positive, reflecting a rise in long-term 
interest rates that anticipates the rise in inflation and short-term rates.  
In order to assess how reasonable these quantitative effects are, it is useful to compare them 
with other empirical results. One relevant literature is the empirical literature on the size of 
wealth/collateral effects of housing on consumption. As discussed in Muellbauer (2007) and 
Mishkin (2007), the empirical results are somewhat diverse, but some of the more robust 
findings suggest that the wealth effects from housing are approximately twice as large as those 
from stock prices. For example, Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek (2006) estimate that the long-run 
marginal propensity to consume out of a dollar increase in housing is 9 cents, compared with 
4 cents for non-housing wealth. Similarly, using cross-country time series, Slacalek (2007) 
finds that it is 7 cents out of a dollar. Overall, the long-run marginal propensities to consume 
out of housing wealth range from 5 to 17 percent, but a reasonable median estimate is 
probably around 7-8 percent compared to a 5 percent elasticity out of stock market wealth. 
How does this compare with the elasticities embedded in our estimated impulse response to a 
housing price shock? A one percent persistent increase in real house prices, leads to a 0.075 
percent increase in real consumption after four quarters. Taking into account that the housing 
wealth-consumption ratio is around three in the United States, this suggest a marginal 
propensity to consumer of about one third of the long-run median estimate reported above. 
This lower effect on consumption may partly be explained by the fact that the increase in 
house prices is temporary. The mean elasticities embedded in the D-VAR are somewhat 
lower.  
We can also compare our estimated impulse response with the simulations using the FRB-US 
model reported in Mishkin (2007). Figure 5 of Mishkin (2007) reports that a 20 percent 
decline in real house prices under the estimated Taylor rule leads to a 1.5 percent deviation of 
real GDP from baseline in a version of the FRB/US with magnified channels, and to only a bit 
more than 0.5 percent in the benchmark version (which excludes an effect on real residential 
investment). Translating our results to a 20 percent real house price shock, suggests a 
multiplier of 2.5 percent. This is quite a bit higher than suggested by the FRB/US simulations, 
but this may be partly due to the strong immediate response of residential investment in our 
case.
Finally, we can also compare the estimated impulse response functions of Figure 3 with the 
impulse responses to a positive housing preference shock in the estimated structural DSGE 
model of the US economy in Iacoviello and Neri (2007). They find that a one percent 
persistent increase in real house prices is associated with a 0.07 percent increase in 
consumption and a 3.6 percent increase in real residential investment. Whereas our estimated 
elasticity of real consumption is very similar, the elasticity of real residential investment is 
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quite a bit lower at approximately 1.5 percent. It falls at the lower bound of the findings of 
Topel and Rosen (1988) who estimate that for every 1 percent increase in house prices lasting 
for two years, new construction increases on impact between 1.5 and 3.15 percent depending 
on the specifications. 
{Insert Figure 4 } 
Turning to the monetary policy shock, Figure 4 shows that a persistent 25 basis point 
tightening of the federal funds rate has the usual delayed negative effects on real GDP and the 
GDP deflator. The size of the real GDP response is quite small with a maximum mean 
negative effect of about 0.1 percent deviation from baseline after three years. This effect is 
even smaller and less significant in the D-VAR specification. The effect on residential 
investment is larger and quicker with a maximum negative effect of 0.03 percentage points of 
GDP (which would correspond to approximately 0.75 percent change) after about two years. 
Real house prices also immediately start falling and bottom out at 0.5 percent below baseline 
after two and half years. The housing market effects are somewhat stronger in the D-VAR 
specification. The higher sensitivity of residential investment to a monetary policy shock is 
consistent with the findings in the literature. For example, using identified VARs Erceg and 
Levin (2002) find that residential investment is about 10 times as responsive as consumption 
to a monetary policy shock. Our results are also comparable with those reported in Mishkin 
(2007) using the FRB/US model. In those simulations, a 100 basis point increase in the federal 
funds rate leads to a fall in real GDP of about 0.3 to 0.4 percent, although the lags (6 to 8 
quarters) are somewhat smaller than those in our estimated BVAR. Also in these simulations, 
the effect on real residential investment is faster (within a year) and larger, but the estimated 
magnitude of those effects (between 1 and 1.25 percent) is quite a bit larger in our case 
(around 2.5 percent). Dynan et al. (2005) argue that the interest rate sensitivity of real 
residential investment has fallen since the second half of the 1980s (partly due to the 
deregulation of the mortgage market in the early 1980s). Our results suggest elasticities that 
are more in line with Erceg and Levin (2002) than with the FRB/US simulations. 
Our results can also be compared with the impulse responses to an adverse interest rate shock 
in Iacoviello and Neri (2007). They find that a 50 basis point temporary increase in the federal 
funds rate leads to a fall in real house prices of about 0.75 percent from baseline, compared to 
a delayed 1 percent fall in real house prices in our case (the delay is partly due to our 
recursive identification assumption). According to the estimates of Iacoviello and Neri (2007), 
real investment responds six times more strongly than real consumption and two times as 
strongly as real fixed investment. Overall, this is consistent with our results. However, the 
effects in Iacoviello and Neri (2007) are immediate, whereas they are delayed in our case.  
(See also Del Negro and Otrok, 2007) 
16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 891
April 2008
In conclusion, the overall quantitative estimates of the effects of a monetary policy shock are 
in line with those found in the empirical literature. Similarly to our results, Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2007) find that a standard deviation shock to the real short-term interest rate has 
about the same quantitative effect on the output gap as a one-standard-deviation shock to the 
real house price gap.
{Insert Figure 5} 
Finally, in the light of the discussion on the role of developments in long-term interest rates 
for the house price boom and bust in the United States and many other countries, it is also 
interesting to have a look at the effects of a term spread shock on the housing market. Figure 5 
shows that a 20 basis point increase in the spread of long-term interest rates over the federal 
funds rate has a quite significant impact on residential investment, which drops by more than 
0.014 percentage points of GDP (which corresponds to a 0.3 percent change) after about a 
year. Also real GDP falls with a bit more of a delay by about 0.075 percent after six quarters. 
Both the GDP deflator and real house prices fall, but only gradually. Overall, the size of the 
impulse responses is, however, small. 
{Insert Table 2a,b} 
Table 2a,b reports the contribution of the three shocks to the forecast error variance at 
different horizons in both specifications. Overall, the housing demand, monetary policy and 
term spread shocks account for only a small fraction of the total variance in real GDP and the 
GDP deflator. Monetary policy and housing demand shocks do, however, account for a 
significant fraction of the variance in the housing market.  
{Insert Figure 6a} 
This can be verified by looking at the contribution of the three shocks to the historical boom 
and bust episode since 2000, as depicted in Figure 6a-b. Each of the two columns reports 
respectively actual developments of the real residential investment/GDP ratio and the annual 
change in real house prices as well as the unconditional forecast as of 2000 and the 
counterfactual evolution if either of the three identified shocks are put to zero. The term 
spread shock does not have a visible impact on the housing market or the economy as a 
whole. The housing demand shock has a large positive impact on the housing market in 2001 
and 2002 and again in 2004 and 2005. A negative demand shock also explains a large fraction 
of the fall in construction and house price growth from 2006 onward. These shocks have only 
negligible effects on overall GDP growth, but do seem to have pushed up inflation by 10 to 20 
basis points over most of the post 2000 period. Loose monetary policy also seems to have 
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contributed to the housing boom in 2004 and 2005. Without the relatively easy policy of late 
2003 and early 2004 the boom in house price growth would have stayed well below the 10 
percent growth rate in 2005. Easy monetary policy also has a noticeable, though small effect 
on GDP growth and inflation.  
The L-VAR results depicted in Figure 6b give similar indications, although they generally 
attribute an even larger role to the housing demand shocks.  
{Insert Figure 6b} 
4. House prices and the monetary policy stance in the US 
The idea of measuring monetary conditions by taking an appropriate weight of interest rates 
and asset prices was pioneered by the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
in the 1990s. As both countries are small open economies, these central banks worried about 
how changes in the value of the exchange rate may affect the monetary policy stance.5 The 
idea was to construct a weighted index of the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate, 
where the weights reflected the relative impact of the exchange rate on an intermediate or final 
target variable, such as the output gap, output growth or inflation. A number of authors have 
extended the idea of the MCI to other asset prices arguing that those asset prices may be 
equally or more important than the exchange rate. One prominent example is Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2007), who argue that real house prices should receive a significant weight in a 
monetary conditions index because of its significant impact on the economy. For the US they 
argue that the relative weight of the short-term interest rate versus house prices should be of 
the order of 0.6 to 1.8.  
In the small literature that developed following the introduction of the MCI concept, a number 
of shortcomings have been highlighted.6 One difficulty is that the lag structure of the impact 
of changes in the interest rate and the real house price on the economy may be different. As 
noted above, according to our estimates the effect of an interest rate shock on economic 
activity appears to take somewhat longer than the effect of a house price shock. In response, 
Batini and Turnbull (2002) (BT from now on) proposed a dynamic MCI that takes into 
account the different lag structure by weighting all current and past interest rates and asset 
prices with their estimated impulse responses. Another shortcoming of the standard MCI is 
that it is very difficult to interpret the MCI as an indicator of the monetary policy stance, 
because it does not take into account that changes in monetary conditions will typically be 
                                                     
5  See, for example, Freedman (1994, 1995ab) and Duguay (1994). 
6  See, for example, Gerlach and Smets (2000). 
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endogenous to the state of the economy. The implicit assumption of the traditional MCI is that 
the monetary conditions are driven by exogenous shocks. This is clearly at odds with the 
identified VAR literature that suggests that most of the movements in monetary conditions are 
responses to the state of the economy. For example, changes in the federal funds rate will 
typically be a response to changing economic conditions and a changing outlook for price 
stability. An alternative way of expressing this drawback is that the implicit benchmark 
against which the MCI is measured does not depend on the likely source of the shocks in the 
economy. As a result, the benchmark in the standard MCI does not depend on the state of the 
economy, although clearly for given objectives the optimal MCI will vary with the shocks to 
the economy. Third, often the construction of the MCI does not take into account that the 
estimated weight of its various components is subject to uncertainty and estimation error. This 
uncertainty needs to be taken into account when interpreting the significance of apparent 
changes in monetary conditions. The methodology developed by Céspedes et al. (2006) 
(CLMM from now on) addresses each of those shortcomings. 
In this section, we apply a version of the monetary conditions index proposed by CLMM to 
derive a measure of the monetary policy stance that takes into account movements in the short 
and long-term interest rate and in real house prices. Using this index we try to answer the 
question whether the rise in house prices and the fall in long-term interest rates since 2000 led 
to an implicit easing of monetary policy in the United States. We use the Bayesian VARs 
estimated in the previous section to implement the methodology. In the next subsection, we 
define the MCI and use a simple analytical example to illustrate its logic. Next, we apply it to 
the US economy using the estimated BVAR.  
4.1. MCI in a VAR: methodology and intuition 
For the sake of example, let the economy be described by a stationary VAR of order one: 
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where tX  is the vector of non-policy variables, such as output and inflation, and tP  is the 
vector of monetary policy and financial variables, such as in our case the short-term interest 
rate, the long-term interest rate spread and the real house price index. As in BT, a standard 
dynamic MCI with respect to a target variable j can then be defined as: 
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where jS  is a selection vector which selects the target variable j from the list of non-policy 
variables. Typically, the target variable in the construction of an MCI is either output growth 
or the output gap. This is based on the notion that financial and monetary conditions affect 
inflation primarily through their impact on spending and output. However, also inflation can 
be used as a target variable. In this paper, we will present results for both output growth and 
inflation as a target variable. The parameter H is the window over which lags of the monetary 
conditions are considered. * stP   is typically given by the steady state of the monetary 
conditions. In our case this would be the equilibrium nominal interest rate, the steady state 
term spread and steady state real house price growth rate. Alternatively, it could also be given 
by the monetary conditions that would have been expected as of period t-H, if there had been 
no shocks from period t-H to t. Equation (2) illustrates that the standard MCI is a weighted 
average of the deviations of current and past policy variables from their steady state values, 
where the weights are determined by the partial elasticity of output with respect to a change in 
the policy variable.  
As discussed above, a problem with this notion of the MCI is that the policy variables are 
treated as exogenous and independent from the underlying economic conditions, or 
alternatively they are assumed to be driven by exogenous shocks. As a result, it is very 
problematic to interpret this index as a measure of the monetary policy stance. For example, it 
may easily be the case that the policy rate rises above its steady state value because of positive 
demand shocks. In that case monetary policy may either be too loose, neutral or too tight 
depending on whether the higher interest rate is able to offset the effect of the demand shocks 
only partially, fully or more than fully. Instead, the standard MCI will always indicate that 
monetary conditions have tightened.   
In contrast to the standard MCI, the alternative MCI proposed by CLMM does take into 
account the endogeneity of the policy instruments. In this case the MCI is defined as: 
(5) 1 * 1 *, 11 12 11 1
1 1
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The first part is the same as in the standard case (equation (4)), but in this case the effects on 
the target variable of the shocks that are most consistent with the observed path of monetary 
conditions are added. More specifically, the shocks are drawn from their distribution subject 
to the restriction that they generate the observed path of monetary conditions. Doan et al. 
(1984) and Waggoner and Zha (1999) show that the mean of this constrained distribution is 
given by: 
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where PstackedH  is a vector of stacked shocks over the window of H periods, R is a stacked 
matrix of impulse response coefficients of the monetary conditions with respect to the shocks 
and ][PEP   is the vector of correspondingly stacked forecast errors associated with the 
observed or assumed monetary conditions over the same window. 
In order to give the intuition for why the MCI by CLMM is a potentially much better indicator 
of the stance of monetary policy, it is useful to go through a simple static analytical example. 
Assume the economy is given by the following set of equations: 
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where ty  is the target variable, say output growth, ts  is the short-term policy rate, th  is real 
house prices and there are three shocks: an output shock, a policy shock and a housing shock. 
Equation (7) reflects the dependence of output on the monetary conditions and an output 
shock. For convenience we have in this case assumed that there are no lags in the transmission 
process. Equation (8) is a monetary policy reaction function and equation (9) shows how the 
house price depends on the short rate and a shock. 
In this case the standard MCI (as in BT) is given by: 
(10)
, 1 2BT t t tM CI s hD D  ,
and is independent of the monetary policy reaction function. If 
1D  is negative and 2D  is 
positive, a rise in house prices will lead to an easing of monetary conditions unless the short-
term interest rate rises to exactly offset the effect of house prices on the target variable.  
Instead, the MCI of CLMM is given by: 
(11) , 1 2 [ | , ]
y
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where we have assumed that all variables are measured as deviations from steady state. As in 
equation (6), the mean output shock needs to be consistent with the observed short-term 
interest rate and the real house price.
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Next we derive the expression of the last term in equation (11) as a function of the interest rate 
and house prices. From equation (6) and (7), it is clear that the relation between the interest 
rate conditions and the shocks is given by: 
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As discussed above, given a joint standard normal distribution of the shocks, the mean of the 
shocks conditional on the observed interest rates is given by: 
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where R is given in equation (12). 
To simplify even further, assume that 03  E , i.e. there is no policy shock. In that case, there 
is a one-to-one relationship between the shocks and the observed interest rate and house price, 
given by: 
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As a result, in this case the MCI of CLMM is given by: 
(15)
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( (1 ) ) ( )CLMM t t tMCI s hD GE E D E E    
Comparing expressions (15) and (10), it is obvious that the MCI’s of BT and CLMM have 
different weights on the short-term interest rate and the house price. The weights in the MCI 
of CLMM depend not only on the partial elasticities of output with respect to the short-term 
interest rate and the house price, but also on the coefficients in the policy reaction function 
and the elasticity of the house price with respect to the short-term interest rate.  
To see why the MCI of CLMM is a better indicator of the monetary policy stance, it is useful 
to investigate how the weights in (15) will depend on systematic policy behaviour. From 
equations (7) and (9), one can easily show that if the central bank targets output growth, the 
optimal interest rate reaction function is given by: 
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If the interest rate elasticity of output is negative ( 01 D  ) and elasticity with respect to the 
house price positive ( 02 !D ), then a central bank trying to stabilise output will lean against 
positive output and house price shocks, where the size of the reaction coefficient will depend 
on the strength and the channels of the transmission mechanism.   
Substituting the coefficients 1E  and 2E  in (15) by the coefficients in expression (16), it can 
be verified that in this case the MCI will be equal to zero. In other words, a policy that 
stabilises output will be seen as a neutral policy according to this index. In contrast, it is 
obvious that such a change in the policy reaction function will not affect the standard MCI. 
Instead assume that the central bank reacts optimally to the output shock as in equation (13), 
but does not respond to the shock to the house price ( 02  E ). In that case, it can be shown 
that the MCI of CLMM is given by: 
(17) , 2 2( )
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Also this result is very intuitive, when the central bank does not respond to house price shocks 
and a rise in house prices has a stimulative impact on output, then the MCI will indicate easy 
monetary conditions whenever there is a positive shock to the house price.
This simple example makes it clear that in order to have a meaningful indicator of the 
monetary policy stance, it is important to realise that the monetary conditions are conditional 
on the shocks hitting the economy.  
4.2. An application to house prices and the policy stance in the US 
Obviously, the static example is too simple to bring to the data. In reality, monetary conditions 
will have lagged effects on output and inflation and the lag patterns may differ across the 
various components as shown in Section 3. In this section, we use the two specifications of 
the estimated BVAR to calculate an MCI for the US economy. Consistent with the MCI 
literature, we use respectively real GDP growth and inflation as the target variables. 
Moreover, in order to take the lags in the transmission process of monetary policy that we 
documented in Section 3 into account, we assume that in the case of real GDP growth the 
target variable is expected annual GDP growth one year ahead, whereas in the case of 
inflation it is expected annual inflation two years ahead. Figures 7a-b show the results of this 
exercise. In order to illustrate the impact of the conditionality of the MCI, we also compare 
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the CLMM measure (which conditions on the full set of shocks) with the BT measure. In the 
latter case, we assume that the observed interest rates and house prices are only driven by the 
exogenous shocks identified in Section 3.   
{Insert Figure 7a} 
Figures 7a-b show the estimated MCIs together with their 68 percent probability regions for 
one-year ahead annual output growth (left column) and two-years ahead annual inflation 
(right column) as target variables, using the federal funds rate (first row), the federal funds 
rate and the term spread (second row) and the federal funds rate, the term spread and the real 
house price (third row) as indicators of monetary conditions. Figure 7a use the D-VAR, 
whereas Figure 7b uses the L-VAR. The shaded area refers to the BT measure. The MCIs 
shown are basically the difference between the conditional forecast of the target variable 
based on the actual path of the monetary conditions and the one based on an equilibrium path 
of the monetary conditions given by the unconditional forecast.  
{Insert Figure 7b} 
A few observations are worth making on the basis of Figure 7a. First, overall the indications 
that come from the MCI based on expected output growth and expected inflation are similar. 
Financial conditions were relatively tight in 2000-2001, gradually became relatively loose in 
the period 2002-2005, before turning tight again during 2006. Second, the uncertainty 
surrounding the MCI is very high. Based on standard significance levels, the monetary 
conditions were not significantly different from neutral during the whole period. Third, taking 
house prices into account (third row of Figure 7a) does seem to matter for measuring the 
monetary policy stance. More specifically buoyant growth in house prices in 2004 and 2005 
suggests that monetary policy was relatively loose in this period, whereas it turned tight in 
2007. During the housing boom, easy monetary conditions implied two-year ahead annual 
inflation that was more than 0.5 percentage points above its steady state. Most recently, tight 
conditions imply expected inflation almost 0.5 percentage points below the target. These 
results differ marginally when the L-VAR specification is used (compare Figure 7b with 7a).  
A comparison of the shaded areas (showing the 68 posterior probability region for the BT 
MCI) with the areas enclosed by dotted lines (showing the 68 percent posterior probability 
region for the CLMM MCI) reveals that, although the broad messages of the estimated MCIs 
are similar, conditioning on exogenous shocks only, gives less precise estimates. This is partly 
the result of the fact that the exogenous shocks contribute only to a limited degree to the 
forecast variance of output and inflation. As a result, the effects are also less precisely 
estimated.  The point estimates are similar, which suggests that the developments in 2002-
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2005 were strongly influenced by the policy and housing demand shocks, and not so much by 
responses to other shocks. 
As is clear from the discussion in section 4.1, the MCIs are a weighted average of current and 
past levels of the short-term interest rate, the term spread (or the long-term interest rate) and 
real house price growth. In order to get an idea of the relative importance of the three 
components, Table 3 gives the sum of the weights on current and up to 8 quarter lagged 
values of each of three components in the MCI. As in Figure 7a, this is done for an MCI 
calculated on the basis of the short-term interest rate, the short and long-term interest rate and 
the short and long-term interest rate and real house price growth respectively and taking both 
annual GDP growth and inflation as target variables. A few observations are worth making. 
First, taking only the short-term interest rate as an indicator of the policy stance, it is clear that 
on average an observed increase of the interest rate above its steady state value indicates a 
restrictive policy stance both with respect to GDP growth and inflation. This is, in particular, 
the case when the short-term interest rate is assumed to be driven by the three identified 
exogenous shocks. However, if the full conditional nature of the nominal interest rate is taken 
into account (as in CLMM), this is less the case and more so for inflation than for growth. The 
reason is that due to the central bank’s reaction function the short-term interest rate is likely to 
increase in response to shocks that drive up future output growth and inflation. In that case a 
rise in interest rates may even suggest an easing of the policy stance if interest rates do not rise 
enough to offset the pick-up in growth and inflation. To the extent that changes in the nominal 
interest rate reflect higher inflation and inflation expectations, this argument will be 
particularly strong when expected inflation is the target.  
Taking the long-term interest rate into account slightly changes the picture. Keeping the long-
term interest rate constant, observing a 1 percentage point increase in the short-term interest 
rate for 8 quarters signals a fall in GDP growth of about 20 basis points over the next year and 
a fall in inflation of somewhat less over the next two years. In contrast, keeping the short-term 
rate constant, a rise in the long-term interest rate by 1 percentage point signals lax monetary 
policy, as it predicts a rise in both GDP growth (9 basis points) and inflation (16 basis points) 
above steady state. Finally, the right-hand panel of Table 3 shows the weights when also real 
house prices are included in the MCI. Including house prices does not very much affect the 
weights on the interest rates. The upper rows show that the weight on real house price growth 
is close to zero when the target variable is GDP growth. This is indeed also reflected in the 
fact that the actual MCI does not change very much in Figure 7a. However, when annual 
inflation in two years time is the target variable, there is a significant weight on house prices. 
A 5 percentage point rise in the growth rate of real house prices for two years signals a rise in 
annual inflation of 30 to 40 basis points in two years time. According to the weights such a 
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rise in house prices would call for a substantially higher short-term rate (of about 2 percentage 
points) in order to have neutral monetary conditions.     
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the role of housing investment and house prices in US 
business cycles since the second half of the 1980s using an identified Bayesian VAR. We 
found that housing demand shocks have significant effects on residential investment and 
house prices, but overall these shocks have had only a limited impact on the performance of 
the US economy in terms of aggregate growth and inflation in line with the empirical 
literature. There is also evidence that monetary policy has significant effects on residential 
investment and house prices and that easy monetary policy designed to stave off perceived 
risks of deflation in 2002 to 2004 has contributed to the boom in the housing market in 2004 
and 2005. However, again the impact on the overall economy was limited. A counterfactual 
simulation suggests that without those policy shocks inflation would have been about 25 basis 
points lower at the end of 2006.  
In order to examine the impact of house prices on monetary conditions, we implement a 
methodology proposed by Céspedes et al. (2006). This methodology consists of calculating 
the forecast of a target variable (expected GDP growth or expected inflation) conditional on 
the observed path of monetary conditions including the short-term interest rates, the term 
spread and house prices. We show that, in spite of the endogeneity of house prices to both the 
state of the economy and the level of interest rates, taking house prices into account may 
sharpen the inference on whether the stance of monetary policy has changed over time. Given 
the uncertainty about the sources of business cycle fluctuations and the impact of the various 
shocks (including housing demand shocks) on the economy, uncertainty regarding the stance 
of monetary policy remains high. Nevertheless, taking the development of house prices into 
account, there is some indication that monetary conditions may have been too loose in 2004 
and were relatively tight in the summer of 2007.  
Various caveats of the methodology we use in this paper are worth mentioning. First, all the 
analysis presented in this paper is in-sample and ex-post. While this is helpful in trying to 
understand past developments, it clearly is not sufficient to prove its real-time usefulness. For 
that, we need to extend the analysis to a real-time context. Second, the statistical model we use 
to interpret the US housing market and business cycle is basically a linear one. It has been 
argued that costly asset price booms and busts are fundamentally of an asymmetric nature. 
Our linear methodology is not able to handle such non-linearities. Third, the robustness of the 
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analysis to different identification schemes for the structural shocks needs to be further 
examined. We hope to shed some light on some of these issues in further analysis.       
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Table 1  
Prior and posterior means and standard deviations of the steady states in the D-VAR 
Variable 
Real
GDP
growth 
Real
Consumption 
growth 
GDP
deflator 
inflation 
Housing
investment 
/GDP
House
price
growth 
Commodity 
price
growth 
Federal
funds 
rate
Term 
spread
Money 
growth 
Prior          
Mean 2.50 2.50 2.00 4.50 0.00 2.00 4.50 1.00 4.50 
Std 0.50 0.71 0.20 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.62 1.00 1.00 
Posterior          
Mean 2.96 3.23 2.21 4.51 1.52 2.00 5.05 1.42 4.35 
Std 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.07 1.08 1.54 0.34 0.24 0.51 
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Table 2a
Shares of housing demand, monetary policy and term spread shocks in variance 
decomposition, D-VAR 
 
  Horizon: 0 3 11 23 
Variable Shock         
Output Housing 0.016 0.034 0.052 0.062 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.039 
  Term premium 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.028 
Consumption Housing 0.005 0.018 0.033 0.055 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.029 
  Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.034 0.063 
Prices Housing 0.002 0.013 0.120 0.166 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.037 
  Term premium 0.000 0.006 0.034 0.046 
House inv. Housing 0.521 0.579 0.382 0.291 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.015 0.175 0.136 
  Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.023 0.062 
House pr. Housing 0.535 0.554 0.410 0.242 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.010 0.068 0.083 
  Term premium 0.000 0.002 0.021 0.060 
Commodity pr. Housing 0.027 0.028 0.041 0.085 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.012 0.167 0.222 
  Term premium 0.000 0.004 0.018 0.055 
Short intr. Housing 0.037 0.061 0.165 0.178 
 Monetary Policy 0.752 0.496 0.192 0.166 
  Term premium 0.000 0.023 0.076 0.088 
Spread Housing 0.090 0.050 0.177 0.186 
 Monetary Policy 0.223 0.303 0.214 0.206 
  Term premium 0.336 0.245 0.146 0.134 
Money Housing 0.060 0.044 0.062 0.099 
 Monetary Policy 0.204 0.141 0.044 0.045 
  Term premium 0.013 0.042 0.129 0.135 
Note: The reported shares are averages over the posterior distribution, and relate to the (log) 
level variables. 
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Table 2b
Shares of housing demand, monetary policy and term spread shocks in variance 
decomposition, L-VAR 
 
  Horizon: 0 3 11 23 
Variable Shock         
Output Housing 0.019 0.049 0.073 0.106 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.005 0.036 0.052 
  Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.026 0.026 
Consumption Housing 0.005 0.021 0.051 0.093 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.008 0.040 0.051 
  Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.021 0.024 
Prices Housing 0.002 0.017 0.127 0.153 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.005 0.038 0.114 
  Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.016 
House inv. Housing 0.582 0.554 0.357 0.351 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.027 0.124 0.125 
  Term premium 0.000 0.015 0.021 0.019 
House pr. Housing 0.586 0.610 0.360 0.229 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.011 0.087 0.066 
  Term premium 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.014 
Commodity pr. Housing 0.030 0.044 0.154 0.149 
 Monetary Policy 0.000 0.008 0.072 0.100 
  Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.015 
Short intr. Housing 0.032 0.055 0.217 0.211 
 Monetary Policy 0.709 0.453 0.206 0.177 
  Term premium 0.000 0.007 0.018 0.018 
Spread Housing 0.072 0.048 0.129 0.150 
 Monetary Policy 0.230 0.281 0.163 0.152 
  Term premium 0.355 0.215 0.114 0.085 
Money Housing 0.040 0.036 0.053 0.066 
 Monetary Policy 0.257 0.237 0.089 0.060 
  Term premium 0.015 0.020 0.021 0.025 
Note: The reported shares are averages over the posterior distribution. 
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Table 3
8-quarter sum of MCI weights (D-VAR) 
 
 MCIi MCIi,s MCIi,s,hp 
 Short 
rate
Short 
rate
Long
rate
Short 
rate
Long
rate
House 
prices
CLMM-GDP -0.162 -0.201 0.090 -0.198 0.102 0.000 
BT-GDP -0.198 -0.190 0.074 -0.194 0.102 0.003 
CLMM-DP -0.046 -0.142 0.162 -0.148 0.250 0.056 
BT-DP -0.154 -0.182 0.168 -0.087 0.180 0.083 
 
31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 891
April 2008
Figure 1 
Data used (as in the D-VAR) and their estimated steady state value 
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Figure 2a 
Housing investment to GDP ratio and annual house price growth rate (1995-2007) 
Actual data and unconditional and conditional forecasts from the D-VAR. 
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Figure 2b 
Housing investment to GDP ratio and annual house price growth rate (1995-2007) 
Actual data and unconditional and conditional forecasts from the L-VAR. 
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Figure 3 
Impulse responses to a housing demand shock (D-VAR and L-VAR) 
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Figure 4 
Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock 
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Figure 5 
Impulse response to a term-premium shock 
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Figure 6a 
Counterfactuals when shutting down each of the identified shocks – D-VAR 
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Panel 2 
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Figure 6b 
Counterfactuals when shutting down each of the identified shocks – L-VAR 
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Panel 2 
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Figure 7a
MCI’s of CLMM and BT – D-VAR 
-3
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
00-01 01-01 02-01 03-01 04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
output conditional on short term interest rate
BT 68pct
CLMM mean
CLMM 68pct
-3
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
00-01 01-01 02-01 03-01 04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
output conditional on short term interest, spread
-3
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
00-01 01-01 02-01 03-01 04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
output conditional on interest, spread, housing prices
-3
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
00-01 01-01 02-01 03-01 04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
prices conditional on short term interest rate
-3
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
00-01 01-01 02-01 03-01 04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
prices conditional on short term interest, spread
-3
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
00-01 01-01 02-01 03-01 04-01 05-01 06-01 07-01
prices conditional on interest, spread, housing prices
42
ECB
Working Paper Series No 891
April 2008
Figure 7b
MCI’s of CLMM and BT – L-VAR 
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Appendix A: Data and sources
Real GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal (GDPC96), Seasonally Adjusted Annual 
Rate, Quarterly, Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, source: FRED, after BEA. 
Real Consumption: Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCECC96), Seasonally 
Adjusted Annual Rate, Quarterly, Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, source: FRED, after 
BEA.
GDP deflator: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF), Seasonally 
Adjusted, Quarterly, Index 2000=100, source: FRED, after BEA 
Fed Funds Rate: Effective Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS), Monthly, 
Percent, Averages of Daily Figures, source: FRED, after Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; averaged over 3 months of the quarter 
Long-term interest rate: 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (GS10), Monthly, 
Percent, Averages of business days, source: FRED after Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; averaged over 3 months of the quarter 
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, quarterly, based on repeated sales, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com; available since 1987 
 
M2: M2 Money Stock (M2NS), Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, Billions of Dollars, 
source: FRED, after Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, averaged over 3 
months of the quarter 
Real Private Residential Fixed Investment, 3 Decimal, (PRFIC96), U.S. Department of 
Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Quarterly, 
Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, source: FRED 
Commodity price index: Dow Jones Spot Average, quarter average, source: Global 
Financial Data (www.globalfinancialdata.com) acronym _DJSD. 
In the VAR we use the interest rate spread, computed as the difference between the long 
interest rate and the federal funds rate, house prices deflated relative to the GDP deflator, and 
the ratio of the real private residential fixed investment to real GDP. All the variables, except 
for the short term interest rate, spread and housing investment, enter either in log levels, or log 
differences (annualized), depending on the VAR specification indicated. 
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